Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development
Volume 18, Spring 2004, Issue 2

Terrorism Insurance Policy and the Public Good
Darius Lakdawalla
George Zanjani

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an
authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
selbyc@stjohns.edu.

Article 4

TERRORISM INSURANCE POLICY AND THE

PUBLIC GOOD
DARIUS LAKDAWALLA & GEORGE ZANJANI1
The September 11 attacks posed a policy challenge to the
United States and its insurance industry. In some respects, the
challenge was familiar. The technical difficulties involved with
assessing and pricing terrorism risk are similar to those
associated with assessing and pricing natural disaster risk. Yet,
in other respects, terrorism risk is unique.
Terrorism is manmade. Unlike an earthquake fault line, the
underlying risk of terrorism will shift in response to changes in
public and private defenses. As a result, it may be hazardous to
extend the policy logic used in natural disaster insurance
markets to the case of the terrorism insurance market. In the
following, we consider the terrorism insurance crisis in the
context of previous insurance market crises and discuss some
issues brought up by the federal policy response.
Like other catastrophe risks (such as those associated with
natural disasters), terrorism risk is both difficult to price and
difficult to diversify. In many lines of insurance, it is possible to
use historical statistics to project future average costs with
reasonable accuracy. This is much more difficult in catastrophe
lines, where one must speculate about scenarios that have never
happened. 2 What if a magnitude 8 earthquake 3 hit modern-day
1 Darius Lakdawalla is affiliated with RAND Corporation and NBER. George
Zanjani is affiliated with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. We would like to thank
Mark Boran, Rebecca Valk, and the staff at the Journal of Legal Commentary for their
help in the preparation of this article and the organization of the Symposium. The views
expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve System, RAND,
or NBER.
2 See James Flannigan, Insurer's Gauge Risks of Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003,
at C1 (indicating that insurance companies can now gauge the potential damage of
terrorist attacks in the same way they predict damage from hurricanes, tornadoes, and
earthquakes).
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San Francisco? What if a category 5 storm 4 hit Miami? What if

al Qaeda deployed a nuclear weapon? Moreover, even where the
risk is assessable, it is still hard to diversify because of its "all or
none" character. An insurer cannot expect stable average losses
from year to year---any given year could bring a major event.
As a result, insurance companies that underwrite catastrophic
risks face extremely high risk-management costs. These costs
are evident in high prices for coverage. Risk management by
insurers in catastrophe insurance markets also breeds eventdriven cycles. It is not unusual to see spikes in price and
restrictions in coverage after a major catastrophe ---such as an
earthquake, hurricane, or a major terrorist attack. 5
Indeed, the insurance market turmoil wrought by the
September 11 attacks fits well with a recurring pattern in the
property-casualty insurance industry. Hurricane Andrew led to
a crisis in the catastrophe reinsurance market of the early
1990's.6 Asbestos and malpractice litigation triggered a crisis in

the liability insurance market in the 1980's. 7 And the cycles
were even more acute in the 19th century. For example, New
York's fire of 1835 destroyed a large portion of lower Manhattan
and drove twenty-three of the twenty-six companies serving the
city into bankruptcy. 8
3 See generally The World; "Great" 8.0 Quake Hits Japanese Island; The Large
Temblor Hurts 246 People, Forces a Mass Evacuation and Cuts Power to Many Homes,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A7 (reporting that the USGS predicts an average of one
magnitude-8 or "great" quake per year and equates the amount of energy released in a
magnitude-8 earthquake equivalent to the energy contained in 1.01 billion tons of TNT).
4 See generally Common Questions (and Answers) on Tropical Weather, Yahoo!
Geocities (contending that category 5 storms have only occurred twice in recorded history,
have winds in excess of 155 mph for at least one sustained minute, and cause substantial
destruction and devastation), at http://www.geocities.com/deadlockdomaincommonq.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
5 See Martin F. Grace et al., Overview of Catastrophe Insurance Markets in the U.S. 5
(Nov. 30, 1998) (prepared for The Wharton Catastrophe Risk Management Project), at
http://rmictr.gsu.edu/Paper s/Cat_ Overview_12-98.pdf.
6 See Robert H. Jerry II, Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11: Reflections on Three
Threshold Questions, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 95, 109 (2002) (measuring similarities between
insurance markets after 9/11 and Hurricane Andrew).
7 See Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and
Enterprise Liability, 22 AM. J. L. &MED. 7, 48 (1996) (describing insurance market
troubles in 19 80's due to rises in malpractice insurance costs); Melissa Zelen, Products
Liability Issues in School Asbestos Litigation, 10 AM. J. L. MED. 467, 486 (1985)
(summarizing difficulty in quantifying insurance costs in asbestos cases).
8 See Cynthia Crossen, New York, New York: From 12/17 to 9/11, America's Biggest
City Proves it Can Rise Above Disaster, WALL ST. J. CLASSROOM ED. (stating that great
fire in 1835 destroyed 700 buildings in flowering business district and caused twenty-
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We have seen insurance market crises before, and they are
often accompanied by calls for federal intervention. However, the
enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA)9
marked a departure from existing federal catastrophe insurance
market policy in several respects. Before TRIA, federal disaster
policy in most markets was largely centered on ex post disaster
assistance through the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) rather than ex ante intervention in the insurance
market.10 Even after including state commitments to disaster
insurance markets (specifically, the California Earthquake
Authority
and
Florida's
Citizens
Property
Insurance
Corporation), the aggregate stated government backing of
catastrophe insurance markets was relatively minor before TRIA.
TRIA, on the other hand, involved a commitment of over $250
billion over three years to back the terrorism insurance market
and completely dwarfed the aggregate of federal and state
commitments to other natural disaster markets.1
This aggressive intervention is not unique to the United
States. The September 11 attacks spawned terrorism insurance
legislation in Australia, France and Germany, to name a few.12
Government-sponsored programs are also present in countries
that have had ongoing problems with terrorism, such as Israel
and the United Kingdom.1 3
Israel's program is especially

three
of twenty-six
insurance
companies
to
declare
bankruptcy),
at
http://www.wsjclassroomedition.com/archive/02nov/ESSY.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
9 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101(a)(6), 116 Stat.
2323 (2002) (suggesting that the US Government should provide financial assistance to
insured parties).
10 See generally Margo D. Beller, Draft DisasterBill FallsShort of Insurers'Hopes, J.
OF COM., May 22, 1996, at 8A (commenting that federal government refuses to the
reinsurance cushion insurers were seeking).
11 See Darius Lakdawalla and George Zanjani, Insurance, Self Protection, and the
Economics of Terrorism, NBER Working Paper #9215 (comparing the government
commitments to various catastrophe insurance markets).
12 See generally Tina Perinotto, Financiers Await Decision On Terror Cover,
AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Mar. 7, 2002 at 51 (noting Australia, as well as France and
Germany, favors insurance schemes which rely on pooled reinsurance).
13 See Lucien J. Dhooge, The Terrorism Insurance Market After September 11: The
Case for Limited Federal Intervention, 34 McGEORGE L. REV. 27, 54-55 (2002) (describing
Israel's Property Tax and Compensation Fund which funds claims for damage caused by
terrorist activity); William B. Bice, Comment, British Government Reinsurance and Acts
of Terrorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 441 (1994) (describing
England's Pool Re program).
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generous in that the government essentially acts as an insurer. 14
Israel pays for all property damage and pays scheduled benefits
to victims who are injured or to families of victims who have died
in terrorist attacks. 15
However, experts disagree on the economic case for
government involvement in the terrorism insurance market.16
The primary concern is the potential for distortion in individual
self-protective behavior, also known as moral hazard. 17 If people
have access to subsidized insurance, will they still take proper
care in protecting themselves?
Will they make adequate
provisions for security? Will developers choose locations with
due regard for terrorism risk if they are insured by the
government for terrorism losses?
These concerns are familiar ones and often arise when
contemplating government involvement in an insurance market.
For example, federal provision of flood insurance might
encourage people to build on flood plains. Of course, building on
a flood plain is not necessarily a bad idea ---there could be good
reasons for locating a project in a high-risk area. Ideally,
however, we would like the builders to consider the full social
consequences of their actions. And if taxpayers are paying for
damages whenever a flood hits, the builders may not be
considering the full costs associated with flood risk and thus may
not be choosing socially optimal locations.
The behavioral
distortion may also be manifest in other dimensions.
For
example, on the eve of the flood, the homeowner on a flood plain
may make less of an effort to protect her home if she is insured
than if she is not insured. These ideas can be extended to the
case of terrorism, so it is not surprising that the self-protection
issue surfaced during the debate on federal terrorism insurance.
14 See generally Ann LoLordo, Caught in the Cross-Fire;Israeli Bill Would Limit
Compensation Claims, BALT. SUN, Aug. 11, 1997, at 1A (reporting a man received cash
compensation from the Israeli government after being wounded in a Palestinian uprising).
15 See generally id. (stating that the Israeli Government had paid over $17 million to
more than 600 claimants since intifada).
16 See Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the
Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 448-50 (2003) (for a case against federal
involvement in terrorism insurance); Jeff R. Brown et al., Federal Terrorism Risk
Insurance, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 647-57.
17 See Margaret Howard, Shifting Risk and Fixing Blame: The Vexing Problem of
Credit Card Obligations in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 84 (2001) (describing how
individuals will "relax" behavior due to the applicability of insurance).
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Terrorism, however, is a complicated problem and involves a
number of political and economic considerations absent in the
case of natural disaster risk. Indeed, a key difference between
terrorism and natural disaster risk is that terrorism is
manmade.
The ground will shake and the wind will blow
regardless of the choices we make, but terrorists will presumably
adjust their plans in response to our choices.
Terrorist
capabilities and target selection cannot be viewed independently
of the self-protection decisions made by potential targets: Selfprotection decisions made by individuals, businesses, and the
government will have important consequences for the
distribution of terrorist attacks. This is not typical of selfprotection against natural risks.
For example, one man's
decision to locate on a fault line will have little impact on his
neighbors' financial exposure to earthquake. Thus, on closer
inspection, the "self-protection issue" is much more complicated
in the case of terrorism than it is in the case of natural disasters.
Self-protection against terrorism involves a variety of
investments and behaviors. It includes security investments
such as fences, guards, guns, and background checks. It also
includes more subtle behavioral changes such as making
decisions about where to live, where to locate an office-building
project, or where to go for entertainment on a Saturday night.
The key question is how an individual's self-protection against
terrorism affects others. In some cases, individual self-protection
can be expected to reduce the risks faced by others. For example,
additional security at a nuclear plant reduces the likelihood of
radiological material from that plant being used as a weapon
against other targets. In other cases, however, it may increase
the risks faced by others. For example, a security guard posted
outside a restaurant may reduce the risk faced by the restaurant,
but some of the risk may simply have been displaced onto
neighboring businesses.
Similar analysis can be applied to self-protection through
avoidance. For example, a decision to abandon a "trophy" office
building project has both negative and positive implications for
others' exposures to terrorism risk.
Neighboring small
businesses may enjoy a decrease in terrorism risk, since they are
no longer exposed to damage resulting from an attack on the
trophy building. But trophy complexes in other parts of the city
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or country may experience an effective increase in terrorism risk,
as terrorist resources will no longer be diverted toward the new
trophy building.
Self-protection choices may also affect society more broadly
through public goods. These are harder to characterize but
include things like national pride, patriotism, or prestige. They
may be easiest to illustrate through examples. First, consider
racial profiling. Suppose a business uses racial profiling as a tool
in its security program. This could conceivably reduce exposure
to terrorism losses, but many would argue that the practice is
bad for society.1S It may tear at the social fabric by alienating
groups targeted by racial profiling.
Second, consider
reconstruction at the World Trade Center site. A skyscraper in
Manhattan may well be a desirable target for terrorists.
Nonetheless, many view rebuilding the site as an essential
expression of national resolve. 19 If a developer were to decline
the project because of the terrorism risk, is this prudent selfprotection or a blow to the national psyche?
The point here is that the private sector response to terrorism
must be considered on a variety of levels. With natural disasters,
a central concern with both ex post disaster assistance and ex
ante insurance market subsidies is the potential encouragement
of risk-taking behavior that is excessive from a social standpoint.
Similar concerns may be present with federal assistance in the
case of terrorism risk, but there is also the problem of terrorism
causing excessive risk-avoiding behavior. Thus, in the case of
terrorism, self-protective behavior (and any policy effect on that
behavior) must be evaluated in the context of the war on
terrorism and with much broader social goals in mind. Indeed, it
has been argued that the TRIA's potential encouragement of
risk-taking behavior was in fact a key underlying motivation,
rather than a worrisome side effect. 20
18 See generally Tomoeh Murakami, ACLU Panel on Racial Profiling Worries about
Arab Americans, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 5, 2001, at A6 (positing that while in certain
instances racial profiling may be understandable, such activities are not acceptable in
modern society).
19 See Deborah C. Roth, Note, Wish You Were Here: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of
Archetectuial Preservation,Reconstruction, and the ContemporaryBuilt Environment, 30
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 395, 416 (2003) (stating, "reconstruction may be paramount
in helping the world recover from the senselessness of terrorism").
20 See Lakdawalla & Zanjani, supra notell.
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Going beyond TRIA, the responses of terrorists have
implications more generally for how society shares terrorism
risk. Liability for acts of terrorism often falls to the targets of
terrorism, who are sued for failing to take adequate precautions.
This assignment of liability may have important consequences
for behavior. Faced with potentially enormous liability bills,
developers may choose not to build major downtown buildings,
while building managers may be cautious in securing their
existing properties. Holding targets fully liable for collateral
damages will thus encourage businesses to think more broadly
about the consequences of an attack on their premises, but it also
may exacerbate the problems of excessive self-protection and
inadequate risk-taking.
In general, the economic evaluation of TRIA is a challenging
enterprise. While the comparison of terrorism risk with natural
disaster risk is suitable as a starting point, it is clear that there
are unique issues associated with terrorism and, in particular, an
economically complex interaction between public policy and
private behavior. How do we strike the right balance between
encouraging people to take socially beneficial risks and
discouraging people from being careless? What are symbolic
properties in New York City or Washington, D.C. or other urban
locations worth?
Should we encourage or discourage their
construction when terrorists are at large? These are tough
questions and are ones that must be wrestled with going forward.

